Современная Европа, 2022, № 1, с. 73-85
УДК 327
KALININGRAD AND THE LITHUANIAN
“GEOPOLITICAL CODE”
© 2022 S. Fernandes
E-mail: sfernandes@eeg.uminho.pt
© 2022 P. Viana
E-mail: sfernandes@eeg.uminho.pt
Received on 22.09.2021
Revised on 18.11.2021
Accepted on 21.12.2021
Abstract. The paper analyses the evolving role of Kaliningrad in shaping Lithua-
nia’s security perceptions vis-à-vis Russia. Applying the framework of the “geopo-
litical code” designed by Flint, the authors question whether the exclave-enclave
nexus in the Kaliningrad region - after the European Union (EU) and the Atlantic
Alliance (NATO) enlargements - has been a relevant change in context that has af-
fected Vilnius’ security perception of Moscow in its “geopolitical code”. The coop-
erative posture of Vilnius initialled in 1991 - and later reinforced through the EU
programmes - tended to be based on achieving the country and EU’s own stability
and development, in a regional perspective, with no strategy to spill over on global
relations with Moscow. Vilnius’ understanding of Russian policies in Georgia and,
mainly Ukraine, represented a change in context from 2008 onwards that brought a
focus on military dimensions concerning the Oblast. This change was convergent
with the same tendency in NATO. Membership in the EU and NATO has reinforced
Lithuanian perceptions of Kaliningrad as a potential ally or enemy. At the bottom
line, Vilnius’ key decisions towards militarization in detriment of cooperation result
from a continued negative security perception of Russia. Although cooperative en-
gagement exists, it has not been able to become a feature of the relation due to the
rationale of this cooperation. Kaliningrad influenced the “geopolitical code” of Lith-
uania concerning Russia but it did not play a decisive role in changing Vilnius’ cal-
culations on how to engage with Moscow.
Keywords: Lithuania, Kaliningrad, Russia, Geopolitical Code, European Union,
NATO, Cooperation, Militarization, Security and Defence policies.
DOI: 10.31857/S0201708322010065
74
Sandra Fernandes, Paulo Viana
Introduction
The Kaliningrad region or Oblast occupies a peculiar geographical position and plays
a significant role in European and Russian geopolitics. After the dissolution of the Soviet
Union in 1991, the Oblast was separated from the territory of the Russian Federation and
became an exclave or semi-exclave [Rozhkov-Yuryevsky, 2013; Gareev, 2013; Zieliński,
2020]. Although exclaves tend to be diminutive in territory and population, they often
exercise disproportionate, and often divisive, roles in international relations [Vinokurov,
2007]. After the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
(NATO) enlargements in 2004, with the Lithuanian and Polish accession, “Kaliningrad
Oblast became a kind of an enclave” or a “semi-enclave” [Ivanauskas et. al., 2017; Se-
bentsov, Zotova, 2018]. As Berger [Berger, 2010: 313] underlines: “All enclaves are bor-
derlands and as such they are characterised by their peripheral status. They act as barriers
against potential ‘others’, and they filter influences both from the surrounding area and
the mainland, but they are also contact zones and meeting points of different cultures,
languages and political orders, which often facilitate exchange and cultural transfer”.
Taking into consideration that Russia has been considered an existential threat to
Lithuania since its independence [Pavlovaite, 2003], this paper questions the role of Kali-
ningrad in shaping the evolution of Lithuanian security perspectives. We posit that - de-
spite the fact that the Oblast is at the same geographical location since 1991 - changes
have been operated in Vilnius’ security perceptions taking into consideration two main
aspects. (a) The Oblast has become a semi-enclave after the 2004 enlargements and (b)
the Lithuanian perception of the Russian threat since independence has endured despite
signs of evolution.
In the aftermath of the reunification of Crimea with Russia, geostrategic significance
of the Oblast has been reinforced in European security and in the Baltic region in particu-
lar [Veebel, Sliwa, 2019]. Should Moscow be successful in seizing a 104 km piece of
land along the Polish-Lithuanian border - known as the Suwalki Gap - the three Baltic
states would be completely cut off from their NATO allies1.
The paper questions whether the evolution of Kaliningrad - as exclave and enclave -
has been a relevant change in context that has affected Vilnius’ security perception of Mos-
cow in its “geopolitical code”. In the first section, we expose the analytical framework that
we apply in this research. The “geopolitical code” [Flint, 2017] of Lithuania is identified in
the subsequent sections of the paper. Secondly, we unpack the contexts in which Kalinin-
grad is viewed cooperatively by Vilnius, and how these dynamics have contributed to frame
the country’s geopolitical code. Thirdly, we identify negative security perceptions of the
Oblast and how they contribute to redefine the Lithuanian code.
1 Sytas (2017) ‘NATO war game defends Baltic weak spot for first time’, Reuters, 18 June. URL:
(accessed:
07.09.2021)
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Kaliningrad and the Lithuanian “geopolitical code”
75
Geopolitical Codes: a framework of analysis
The concept of geopolitical codes was originally developed by Gaddis [Rae, 2007] in
his analysis of U.S. post-war security policy. Rae observes that those codes are a relative-
ly stable framework for understanding the world. However, they could change spatially
depending on the assumption regarding the interests and threats of a given country. Flint
and Taylor [Flint, Taylor, 2018] and Flint [Flint, 2017] have defined this concept as dy-
namic and in a framework which permits the identification of markers of change and the
assessment of how changes in context might alter foreign policy calculations. Flint exem-
plifies with the Baltic countries’ NATO membership, a dramatic change in a geopolitical
code as these countries were part of the Soviet Union. This geopolitical framework of
analysis is suited to unpack political calculations and incorporates both classical and criti-
cal dimensions of the field1.
Considering the geopolitical code as the way in which each country orientates itself
towards the world, Flint considers five main calculations to define a code: “(a) Who are
our current and potential allies? Who are our current and potential enemies? (b) How can
we maintain our allies and nurture potential allies? (c) How can we counter our current
enemies and emerging threats? (d) How do we justify the four abovementioned calcula-
tions to our public, and to the global community?” [Flint, 2017]. Thus, our paper aims at
identifying Vilnius’ “geopolitical code” by addressing these questions.
A geopolitical code “is the product of state elites”2 and is generally connected with
national myths. “Visions of one’s country and its position in relation to other countries
are formed within particular national myths. These myths form the basis for geopolitical
codes and the means to represent and interpret these goals so that they obtain popular
support.” [Flint, 2017: 311]. National myths include concepts of sovereignty, territory and
state security, and threats are commonly originated by other nations. Thus, national myths
require the construction of us/them and inside/outside identities. We explore below how
Kaliningrad, as a Russian territory, has been incorporated in Vilnius’ geopolitical code
that includes negative security perceptions of Russia.
This methodological choice needs to be understood in the agent-structure debate in
geopolitics, as Flint himself underlines [Flint, 2017]. Firstly, agents cannot act freely, but
they are able to make choices. Secondly, agents act within structures that limit, or con-
strain, the possible actions of the agent. Furthermore, structures provide opportunities for
agents to attain their goals. Finally, an agent can also be a structure and vice versa [Flint,
2017; Peet, 1998]. Thus, we use this framework of analysis to explain the manner in
1 Van Effrink, L. (2012) Colin Flint: structure agency, identity, peace networks, geopolitical codes/
visions URL:
ks_geopolitical_codes_visions_agents_actors_representations_practices_spaces_powers_environ
mental_geopolitics/ (accessed: 20.03.2021)
2 Ibid.
Современная Европа, 2022, № 1
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Sandra Fernandes, Paulo Viana
which state elites have been taking decisions within the (geopolitical) context regarding
Kaliningrad, which involves positioning towards Russia and the effects of EU and NATO
integration. The framework of analysis suggests that the country’s view about this ques-
tion is tightly influenced by its “geopolitical code”, which is by definition, a highly biased
picture of the world [Flint, Taylor, 2018].
Finally, the “geopolitical code” framework can be put under the theorical perspective
of the “security dilemma” that offers a language to frame the empirical situation and ways
of thinking about what is necessary to ameliorate tensions. In particular, the “security di-
lemma sensibility” [Booth, Wheeler, 2008] - referring broadly to the ability to understand
the fear that one's own actions can generate in others - and the (in)capacity of States to
exercise this “sensibility” pervades the security environment.
The “geopolitical code” framework allows us to grasp the complexity of agency in the
sense that multiple identities and goals have an impact at the decision level on the course
of external action [Flint, 2017]. Our paper focuses on the specific impact of the Kalinin-
grad region on Lithuanian positioning towards Russia in terms of security guarantee per-
ceptions. We consider the effects of EU and NATO integration on this issue as a change
in context since, parallelly, Kaliningrad became a semi-enclave and Vilnius reinforced its
security perceptions towards Moscow. We apply below this framework to assess how
changes in context might alter foreign policy calculations. In other words, we outline in
what ways the Lithuanian “code” has been dynamic, considering the impact of the Kali-
ningrad exclave-enclave question in different contexts.
Kaliningrad as “another” Russia for Vilnius: dynamics of cooperation
After declaration of sovereignty, Lithuanian political elites had the ambition to main-
tain a certain neutrality regarding the tensions between East and West. The Outline of the
Concept of National Security of 1990, drafted even before Lithuanian independency,
highlights intentions on maintaining neutrality by becoming a zone of greater confidence
between the East and the West. Despite the fact that the document doesn’t contain clear
reference to particular threats, Miniotaite [Miniotaite, 1999] identifies the Soviet Union as
the implicit threat to the country’s security. In June 2000, this perception of Russia as a
threat was made explicit, for instance, in the editorial of the leading Lithuanian daily news-
paper, as follows: “the spirit of militaristic and ideological communist revenge is alive in
Russia…destabilizing Russian-Lithuanian relations and the whole world” [Pavlovaite,
2003: 199].
Although the USSR and later the Russian Federation were considered by Lithuanian
public opinion1 and elites2 as a threat to the country’s security, Vilnius’ relations with
Moscow seemed closer when compared to the other Baltic states. While Lithuania suc-
1 Centre for Insights in Survey Research (2020) Public Opinion Poll: Lithuania, 7-26 June 2020.
cessed: 07.09. 2021)
2 Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of Lithuania and State Security Department of the
Современная Европа, 2022, № 1
Kaliningrad and the Lithuanian “geopolitical code”
77
cessfully signed a border treaty prior to the former’s accession to the EU and NATO, Ri-
ga and Tallinn’s attempts to sign a similar treaty were fruitless. The absence of territorial
disputes between Moscow and Vilnius played a key role in paving the way for the signa-
ture of the treaty [Fernandes, Correia, 2018]. Relations seemed closer when it came to
cooperation through Kaliningrad. In fact, both countries successfully signed an Agree-
ment on Illegal Migrant Readmission in the framework of Kaliningrad negotiations [Kar-
abeshkin, 2015]. Cultural cooperation has also been developed, namely educational coop-
eration (Baltic University Programme and ERAMUS+ programme) and a cultural attaché
in the Consulate General in Kaliningrad until a recent downsizing to one position for the
entire Russian Federation1.
Despite Russia being perceived as a threat in Lithuania’s political elite imaginary,
from 1991 until 2008 relations between Vilnius and the Kaliningrad region were mainly
grounded on cooperation. The key element was the natural, functional and political fea-
tures of “cross border regions” [Kolosov, Sebentsov 2019: 76]. We develop below exam-
ples of cross-border cooperation that, according to Khudoley [Khudoley, 2019], are
“functional” and practical relations with positive effects in the presence of a deteriorating
international situation.
The cross-border agenda between the Baltic country and the Oblast is primarily
grounded in two fields: regional economic cooperation and the transit of Russian citizens
and military units through the Baltic country. Engagement in the New Hansa2 organiza-
tion (Kaunas and Kaliningrad are members) serves as a tool for cross-border cooperation
through city diplomacy [Vasilyeva, Kosov, 2017]. The New Hansa is seen as the “incar-
nation” of the Hanseatic League referring to successful trade cooperation between the
XIII and XIV centuries in the region. History, an essential aspect in the establishment of
national myths, contributes positively to the perception of the Russian “other” through
Kaliningrad.
From the very beginning of 1991, Moscow took action to alleviate the problem origi-
nating from Kaliningrad’s geographical position as “Lithuania and Russia soon reached a
provisional arrangement allowing visa-free travel for Russian citizens across Lithuanian
territory” [Diener, Hagen, 2011: 580]. Moreover, during Boris Yeltsin’s administration a
regionalization of Russia could be noted while, at the time, Lithuania was able to develop
direct relations with the Oblast. In 1994, a consulate of the Baltic country was opened in
Kaliningrad, and in 1995, another agreement on visa-free travel for visits shorter than 30
days was signed to facilitate mobility of the residents of Kaliningrad and of the Lithuani-
an citizens entering the region [Ivanauskas et al., 2017]. The 2002 National Security
Strategy refers to Vilnius’ intention to maintain good economic, commercial, and cultural
1 Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Lithuania (2021) Office of Cultural Attaché has been es-
Современная Европа, 2022, № 1
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Sandra Fernandes, Paulo Viana
relations with Kaliningrad1 and highlights intentions to involve the region in European
and regional cooperation. Concurrently, Lithuanian elites expressed a willingness to help
solve the problems that Kaliningrad posed to the whole region [Pavlovaite, 2003]. Alt-
hough Lithuania’s relations with the Oblast are mooted to be the trial, test, and model for
socializing the Russian ‘other’, they are also seen as a way of helping to develop a genu-
ine strategic partnership between Europe and Russia [Vitunic, 2003; Ivanauskas et al.,
2017].
Before Lithuania’s accession to the EU, mobility questions transformed as Kalinin-
grad would become a Russian enclave within the Union, raising concerns about citizens
transit into the Schengen area and the visa regime that would be applied. “The priority
objectives of the exclave region were to ensure transport accessibility and to reduce polit-
ical tension brought about by the exclave being sandwiched between EU and NATO
member-states” [Mikhaylova, 2019: 97]. The main issue regarding Lithuania’s accession
to the EU was the enlargement of the Schengen Area.
In the 2002 Joint Statement on Transit between the Kaliningrad Region and the Rest
of the Russian Federation, the EU and Russia acknowledged the unique geographical sit-
uation of the Kaliningrad region2. Both agreed to take comprehensive measures to facili-
tate border passage. Russia-Lithuania-EU tripartite negotiations resulted in the signing of
the Facilitated Transit Document (FTD) and the Facilitated Railway Transit Document
(FRTD), for transit by train, bus and car [Vinokurov, 2020: 67]. The search for a more
open dialogue shows how the existing “geopolitical code” can be justified to the popula-
tion, which at the same time, in practical terms, implied important changes in daily life.
An initial agreement on Local Border Traffic (LBT), also known as Small Border
Traffic, was also reached in 2009 for transit issues but abandoned by Lithuania in 2012.
The withdrawal resulted namely from a growing concern about Lithuania’s territory
openess [Anisiewicz, Palmowski, 2014: 80-81]. At the same time, probably as an attitude
to preserve good relations regarding cross-border cooperation, Vilnius decided to build
new border crossing points3.
After 2004, economic cooperation between Lithuania and Kaliningrad evolved. An
enthusiastic vision towards enlargement and its consequential benefits in regard to EU-
Russian relations and with the Oblast existed. The idea that Kaliningrad could be a test-
ing ground, a bridge or pilot region for enhancing cooperation between Russia and the EU
1 Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of Lithuania (2002) National Security Strategy.
2 Kremlin (2002) Joint Statement of the European Union and the Russian Federation on Transit
between the Kaliningrad Region and the Rest of the Russian Federation. URL:
3
15 Min
(2012) Lithuania to build new border crossing point at Kaliningrad. URL:
LRT (2019) Lithuania moves ahead with new checkpoint on Russian border. URL:
Современная Европа, 2022, № 1
Kaliningrad and the Lithuanian “geopolitical code”
79
existed at the time, namely becoming a thriving area of liberalized free trade between the
EU and Russia. Thus, becoming an enclave presented the opportunity for Kaliningrad to
become a “region of cooperation” and the future Hong Kong of the Baltic Region [Seben-
tsov, Zotova, 2018; Jokubaitis, Lopata, 2010].
The status of Kaliningrad as a pilot project could have resulted in a “reciprocal and
open strategic partnership” [Maass, 2020: 518] between Russia and the EU, namely un-
der the Neighbourhood Programme
«Lithuania, Poland, Kaliningrad region»,
2004-2006. For the period, more than 44,5 million euros from the European funding
were allocated to the Programme, resulting in 162 cross-border projects [Richard, Se-
bentsov, Zotova, 2015: 9]. Since 2007, the European Neighbourhood and Partnership
Instrument (ENPI) finances cross-border cooperation, mainly involving cities located in
the coastal region [Richard, Sebentsov, Zotova, 2015].
The Northern Dimension (ND) is another ongoing programme that was also seen as
an opportunity for Kaliningrad to act as a “bridge to Moscow-Brussels relations”, namely
in the successful areas of public health, social well-being, and culture. The programme
embodied the principle of depoliticized cooperation and Europe’s ‘new regionalism, thus
a model for cooperation and a platform for informal dialogue maintaining a positive in-
teraction potential [Kolosov, Sebentsov, 2019].
These programmes directed towards diminishing the disparities between the countries
of the EU and the Oblast reinforced the view that the EU has of the region as an external
security problem with the view of guaranteeing the Union’s own security and to support
the development of its own frontier regions [Browning, 2003; Richard, Sebentsov, Zoto-
va, 2015]. Therefore, we can incur that Lithuania shared the same EU biased image of
Kaliningrad. After accession, Vilnius’ actions were also delimited by its political and le-
gal commitments towards the EU and the country’s cooperation with Kaliningrad has
been happening mainly through European institutions. For instance, Vilnius had an active
role in setting guidelines for transit programs between Kaliningrad and Russia, as well as
in preparing its implementation measures [Ivanauskas et al., 2017].
The choice of Lithuanian elites to join the EU and NATO was based on an Atlanticist
and Brussels-focused geopolitical vision of the European continent [Sawka, 2015]. Thus,
Russia would be outside Europe in Lithuania’s imaginary. Consequently, Lithuania has
made a clear choice favouring cooperation with the EU over Russia, making the EU as its
main partner in its “geopolitical code”. Kaliningrad occupied a more benign place in the
code, as “another Russia”, allowing the Oblast to be considered as potential ally for Vil-
nius’ security interests. However, as we will demonstrate in the next section, recent con-
text has provoked major changes in the role of Kaliningrad in the Lithuanian “geopolitical
code” vis-à-vis Russia.
Kaliningrad’s role in “othering” Russia: the prevalence
of security concerns
If cooperation was part of Vilnius-Moscow relations since 1991, 2008 and 2014 can
be considered as turning points. The biased image of Kaliningrad evolved in the opinion
of Lithuanian population and elites, as more of a threat instead of an opportunity to coop-
Современная Европа, 2022, № 1
80
Sandra Fernandes, Paulo Viana
erate [Piotrowski, 2018]. Maass [Maass, 2020] indicates 2015 as another significant date
for this recalibration after the deployment of Russian missiles in the Oblast. During the
1990’s the apprehension regarding Kaliningrad’s militarization was closely related to
soft-security issues and the demilitarization of the territory [Lopata, 2004].
According to Lithuanian analysts, the conflict in Eastern Ukraine increased Lithuani-
an concerns about Russia’s intentions and “calls for reconsideration (from the West) of
the threats in the region, and, with Russia exerting pressure on the neighbouring states
and even raising a military challenge to the security of the entire Baltic Sea Region, it is
now critical to see Kaliningrad as Moscow’s tool to deter NATO from greater visibility in
the region” [Ivanauskas et al., 2017: 148].
NATO became, thus, central in Vilnius’s perception of Kaliningrad as - together with
the adjacent corridor at Suwalki - it is well positioned to disable the Alliance’s air and
sea abilities [Frühling, Lasconjarias, 2016]. The Oblast is the only place where NATO
needs to be able to neutralize Russia’s A2/D2 (anti-access and area denial) capabilities if
its collective defence guarantee is to remain credible. Therefore, “we (NATO) have to
practice, we have to demonstrate that we can support allies in keeping (the Gap) open”1.
The positions of Lithuanian elites are similar with NATO's stances on Kaliningrad,
seeing the region as a threat, and thus as a common enemy, which bolsters in the Lithua-
nian imaginary the need to hold tight to its Alliance since militarization re-started in the
last decade in the region. The 2020 National Threat Assessment articulates this under-
standing and underlines that the Russian increase of military potential and activity in the
Western Military District calls for cautiousness regarding these hostile intentions2. As
compared to the 2002 National Security Strategy, above-mentioned, where the Oblast
was seen as an opportunity for cooperation, the new document portrays Kaliningrad as a
latent threat. This shift demonstrates how dynamic the “geopolitical code” of a country is,
as Kaliningrad has evolved from a potential ally to a potential enemy.
A main concern for Vilnius is the installation of Iskander ballistic missiles in the Ob-
last, a high precision weapons system with a range of over 500 km, capable of carrying
nuclear warheads [Oldberg, 2015]. As, in Vilnius views, Moscow had already acted ag-
gressively in the post-Soviet space in Georgia and Ukraine, Russian military exercises of
considerable dimensions during the same period near the Suwalki Gap were interpreted as
a warning of Moscow’s intentions. The missiles and Russia’s most extensive military ex-
ercises carried out since the end of the Cold War (in Kaliningrad and Belarus) ultimately
posed a direct threat to NATO and the EU [Maass, 2020].
1 Sytas (2017) ‘NATO war game defends Baltic weak spot for first time’, Reuters, 18 June. URL:
2021)
2 Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of Lithuania and State Security Department of the
Republic of Lithuania
(2020)
National Threat Assessment
2020, p.4. URL:
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Kaliningrad and the Lithuanian “geopolitical code”
81
From 2015 onwards, additional Russian combat capabilities in the region (and Crimea
and the Artic) such as modern Su-30SM / FLANKER-H multi-role fighter jets1 have in-
creased the capability of the Oblast’s forces to conduct military operations without rein-
forcements from mainland Russia2. Further militarization of Kaliningrad transformed
Vilnius’s understanding of the Oblast from a vulnerable and exposed territory (a semi-
enclave sandwiched between NATO and the EU) to a potential threat to the Baltic coun-
tries, resulting in a change of “geopolitical code” tailored to the need of containing this
(new) potential enemy.
In practice, the change is observable in Vilnius’ growing defence spending since
2014. The defence budget has grown from approximately 0,8% to over 2,1% of the coun-
try’s GDP, above the NATO 2% goal. Moreover, there is a political commitment to in-
crease this figure to 2,5% by 20303, in contrast with the previous era of disinvestment.4
Additionally, after 2014 all the Baltic countries started to erect fences at their borders
with Russia. Lithuania justified this decision by alluding to a potential (military) threat
posed by Russia5. The expansion of training areas in Western Lithuania in Rukla, Kazlų
Rūda and Pabradė is also meant to accommodate exercises of Lithuanian and NATO sol-
diers6. NATO and Lithuania’s positions have, thus, converged on Russia’s continued mil-
itary build-up in Kaliningrad and the Alliance acknowledges Lithuania’s active political
and military role in NATO7.
The convergence of official positions on Russia’s security challenge (militarization of
the Oblast and the regional instability after the Georgian and Ukrainian crises) is shared
by the Lithuanian public opinion. In a 2020 poll, only 14% of the respondents strongly
agreed with the following: “Lithuania’s interests are best served by maintaining strong
relations with Russia”. Among those who strongly agreed that Lithuania should maintain
1 Heritage, T. (2015) ‘Russia to step up combat capabilities in Crimea’, Reuters, 13 January. URL:
2 Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of Lithuania and State Security Department of the
Republic of Lithuania
(2020) National Threat Assessment
2020, p.24. URL:
3 Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of Lithuania (2020) Lithuanian Defence System:
4
Trading
Economics
(no
date)
Lithuania
Military
Expenditure.
URL:
5 Day, M.
(2017)
‘Lithuania to build fence along its border with Russia to pro-
ws/2017/01/17/lithuania-build-fence-along-border-russia-protect-provocations/.2017 (accessed:
07.09.2021)
6 Jankauskas, K. (2020) ‘Lithuania to Endorse Building Foreign Military Base - OpEd’, Eura-
siaReview,
endorse-building-foreign-military-base-oped/ (accessed: 10.03.2021)
7 NATO News (2021) NATO Secretary General and the Lithuanian Foreign Minister shared views
08.03.2021)
Современная Европа, 2022, № 1
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Sandra Fernandes, Paulo Viana
strong relations with Moscow, 34% thought that “Russia is close and dangerous - we
must keep on good terms to protect ourselves”; and only 2% believed that “Russia is our
true ally and guarantor of national borders and sovereignty”. On the other hand, 64% of
the respondents strongly agreed that the national interests are best served by maintaining
strong relations with the EU, and 51% strongly agreed that their country’s interests are
best served by maintaining strong relations with NATO1.
In another poll, 71% of Lithuanians trusted the Lithuanian Armed Forces, confirming
the public support that the Minister of Defence, Raimundas Karoblis, wanted to gather2.
Moreover, 65% of respondents thought that the Russian Federation was using information
to influence the people of Lithuania deliberately in order to sway their attitudes. Percep-
tions of Russian soft power also fed mistrust as it is seen as a threat to national security
and has been criticised by local organizations and elites [Vorotnikov, Ivanova, 2019].
Russia reoccupies, thus, a central place in Lithuanian “national myths” and the Atlantic
Alliance consequently, as 71% of the country’s population is satisfied that foreign NATO
troops are stationed in Lithuania ensuring their security and 51% consider that military
exercises in the region are needed to maintain NATO's readiness to defend their country3.
The convergence of thinking among the political elite and the population attests the pro-
gressive change of Lithuania “geopolitical code” over the past years that, according to the
theoretical model, cannot be enacted unless the majority of the population is acquiescent.
Conclusion
This paper has analysed the Lithuanian “geopolitical code” in order to unpack its per-
ceptive role of the Russian semi-enclave of Kaliningrad in shaping Lithuanian security
perceptions and key policy changes. Positing that Russia has been continuously perceived
as a threat since the independence of the country in 1991, we have argued that this per-
ception has evolved in nature and intensity in different contexts and that Vilnius’ chang-
ing actions towards the Oblast are illustrative of this evolution. Cooperation dynamics are
a straightforward path to identify a country’s “geopolitical code”. In this case they demon-
strated how Lithuania used to consider Kaliningrad differently when compared to Russia, in
other words, as a potential ally with whom relationships could be nurtured. Cross-border
1 Centre for Insights in Survey Research (2020) Public Opinion Poll: Lithuania. URL:
07.09.2021)
2 Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of Lithuania (2019) Numbers of citizens who have
confidence in the Lithuanian Armed Forces and are prepared to defend the Motherland
ve_confidence_in_the_lithuanian_armed_forces_and_are_prepared_to_defend_the_motherland_
are_increasing.html (accessed: 01.05.2021)
3 Centre for Insights in Survey Research (2020) Public Opinion Poll: Lithuania. URL:
07.09. 2021)
Современная Европа, 2022, № 1
Kaliningrad and the Lithuanian “geopolitical code”
83
and cultural cooperation between Lithuania and Kaliningrad has evolved and perdured over
the past decades (whether bilateral, multilateral or based on European initiatives).
However, the opportunities to build closer relations with Moscow, generated by a co-
operative engagement until the mid-2000’s, have faded away for two main reasons. First-
ly, the cooperative posture stemming from Vilnius - and later its reinforcement through
EU programmes - tended to be based on achieving the country and EU’s own stability
and development, in a regional perspective, with no strategy to spill over on global rela-
tions with Russia. As a consequence, the fact that the Oblast was perceived by Lithuania
as “another Russia”, in an initial phase, was not prone to trigger a real change in the Lith-
uanian “geopolitical code".
Secondly, change in the context that influences Vilnius’ understanding of Russian
policies in Georgia and, mainly Ukraine, from 2008 onwards brought a focus on military
dimensions concerning the Oblast. This recontextualization was in line with the same
tendency that the Atlantic Alliance displayed. Ultimately, in either the cooperative and
defensive phase, membership in the EU and NATO has reinforced Lithuanian perceptions
and key decisions (towards militarization in detriment of cooperation) as both organisa-
tions shared a common understanding with Vilnius on each dimension, respectively.
However, as underlined by Okunev [Okunev, 2013: 74], “geopolitical codes” are dynam-
ic and coalition strategies are “forged to meet a specific objective, hence their ad hoc na-
ture. In these circumstances, a country feels free to choose its allies and rivals of its own
accord.” The positive cooperative elements concerning the Kaliningrad case have, thus,
still the potential to impact on the Lithuanian “code”.
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