Современная Европа, 2022, № 3, с. 5-17
УДК 327
REINVIGORATING COOPERATIVE SECURITY
IN A POLARISED WORLD1
© 2022 Thomas GREMINGER
Ambassador, PhD in History, Economics and Political Science, Director,
Director’s Office, Geneva Centre for Security Policy.
Chemin Eugene-Rigot 2D, 1211 Geneva.
© 2022 Rose WASHINGTON
MA in Governance, Development and Public Policy; BA in Political Science with minor
in Psychology, Project Officer, Director’s Office, Geneva Centre for Security Policy.
Chemin Eugene-Rigot 2D, 1211 Geneva.
Поступила в редакцию 22.02.2022
После доработки 28.02.2022
Принята к публикации 15.03.2022
Abstract: European security is at a critical juncture that could spin into conflict if left
unattended. Deteriorating levels of mutual trust, eroding arms control frameworks,
belligerent rhetoric, heightened transnational threats, and the danger of accidents and
incidents are shaping our current polarised environment. While today’s security
threats urgently call for collaborative solutions, multilateral initiatives are increasingly
questioned and weakened. As a result, Europe is captured in a gridlock that can only
be resolved through dialogue, reengaging, and reforming multilateral institutions.
Therefore, this paper aims to critically assess Europe’s current security environment
1 Статья бывшего генерального секретаря Организации по безопасности и сотрудничеству в
Европе Томаса Гремингера, директора Женевского центра политики безопасности (GCSP), и
Роуз Вашингтон (GCSP) посвящена проблеме обеспечения кооперативной безопасности в
Европе в связи с растущими транснациональными рисками, конфликтами и деградацией си-
стемы контроля над вооружениями. Особое внимание уделено роли ОБСЕ в этом процессе.
Статья была подготовлена в начале 2022 г., однако её концептуальные положения сохраняют
свою актуальность и могут быть востребованы в обозримом будущем. (Прим. ред.) [The arti-
cle by former Secretary General of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Thom-
as Greminger, Director of the Geneva Center for Security Policy (GCSP), and Rose Washington
(GCSP) explores the problem of cooperative security in Europe in the light of growing transnational
risks, conflicts and the degradation of the arms control system. Particular attention is paid to the role
of the OSCE. Although the article was prepared at the beginning of 2022, its conceptual provisions
remain relevant and might be in demand in the foreseeable future. (Editorial note)]
6
Thomas Greminger, Rose Washington
and propose effective pathways to mitigate risks and restore peace. Against this back-
ground, the authors argue that cooperative security is Europe’s best option to sustain-
ably counter the ever-growing security threats and prevent devastating conflicts or un-
intended escalation between states. From this perspective, this article stresses the need
to identify common interests and challenges and anchor European security in jointly
agreed principles to maintain and sustain peace in Europe. In this vein, it highlights
the vital importance of a mutual understanding of fundamental security principles, as
the current standoff between Russia and the West around Ukraine exemplifies. Be-
yond, it gives momentum to the renewal of cooperative security in the run-up to the
50th anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act in 2025.
Key words: Cooperative security, multilateralism, OSCE, European security, transna-
tional security threats, Helsinki Final Act.
DOI: 10.31857/S0201708322030019
EDN: GEQJJG
Introduction
Cooperative security is a timely endeavour given the growing polarisation between
the key Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security players, the disarray of arms control re-
gimes, and the increasing risk of military incidents. Moreover, low levels of trust and the
crisis of multilateral institutions are amplifying Europe’s fragile security climate.
On the one hand, an erosion of the complex network of arms control mechanisms
undermines global security. To exemplify, this includes the end of the Intermediate-
Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), the non-implementation of the Conventional Arms
Control Treaty in Europe (CFE), the withdrawal of the USA and Russia from the Open
Skies Agreement, and the blocked revision of the Vienna Document1 (VD). The INF
treaty legally bound the U.S. and USSR to eliminate and abandon ground-launched in-
termediate ballistic and cruise missiles ranging between 500 and 5500 km [Immenkamp,
2019]. With the end of the INF agreement, Europe’s security backbone is destabilising.
In addition, the CFE, the Open Skies Agreement2, and the VD constitute Europe’s over-
arching arms control framework. The CFE establishes an equilibrium of conventional
forces; the Open Skies Treaty provides transparency mechanisms via aerial monitoring;
and the VD manifests military confidence and security-building measures (CSBM)
[Schmitt, 2018]. More optimistically, the United States and Russia agreed in February
2021 to extend the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) by five years.
Despite this, the system that has provided us with relative peace and stability in Europe
for the last three decades is eroding.
On the other hand, low levels of trust and an increased risk of accidents and inci-
dents jeopardise international security. Incidents at sea, in the air, or on land could lead
1 Vienna Document 2011 on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures. Organization for Secu-
rity
and
Co-operation
in
Europe.
30.11.2011.
URL:
2 Treaty on Open Skies. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. 24.03.1992. URL:
Современная Европа, 2022, № 3
Reinvigorating Cooperative Security in a Polarised World
7
to unintended escalations. Charap’s research [Charap, 2020] highlights potential conflict
drivers, revealing that such ambiguous incidents can cause friction and escalation. Espe-
cially in times of heightened tension, information on intention is unclear due to insuffi-
cient communication channels between key actors. Jervis’ ground-breaking research
[Jervis,1976] emphasises the critical role of decision-makers’ perceptions and misper-
ceptions in international relations. Specifically, he highlights that the roots of many con-
flicts lie in the actors’ diverging perceptions. Particularly in polarised or hostile envi-
ronments, incidents are more likely to escalate in the absence of trust and dialogues be-
tween actors. As Jervis underlines [Jervis, 1976: 321], humankind is hesitant to believe
that actions impacting them in a fast sequence could have occurred by chance. In this
view, he states, «when two events are appropriately coincidental in time, space and se-
quence, an unavoidable and indivisible experience of causality occurs». In other words,
security actors are more likely to perceive an incident or accident as planned instead of
coincidental. This effect is reinforced if the involved parties are in conflict due to the
limited information exchange. The fog of war is made thicker due to fake news and in-
tentional misinformation. Because of perceived threat or insecurity, one side will seek to
strengthen its security. This triggers a similar response by the other side, leading to a
potentially dangerous tit-for-tat escalation. Therefore, it is imperative to de-escalate and
de-militarise the situation, open communication channels, and put in place measures to
increase confidence and predictability.
In a globalised world, nearly all security threats are transnational. Individual states
can no longer contain these threats independently; a multilateral approach is essential.
Examples include efforts to combat terrorism and violent extremism, state and non-state
threats in cyberspace, human trafficking, weapons, or technological changes (particular-
ly Artificial Intelligence). Simultaneously, rapid technological advances in security bring
along opportunities and risks as benevolent and malicious actors instrumentalise new
and powerful tools. Rickli and Krieg [ Krieg, Rickli, 2019] highlight the rise of surro-
gate warfare, characterising inter-state conflicts in the 21st century. The authors portray
this phenomenon as the actors’ partial or complete delegation of warfare’s strategic, op-
erational or tactical elements to human or technological substitutes aiming to minimise
costs. These involve the usage of armed drones, private sector actors and cyber propa-
ganda, among others. While surrogate warfare might facilitate the state’s security provi-
sion in transnational conflicts, it can significantly contribute to the unpredictability, ob-
scurity, uncontrollability, and spread of conflict [Krieg, Rickli, 2019]. Considering the
obfuscated conflict actors, the high complexity and uncertainty can further mistrust be-
tween states and increase security risks. The OSCE’s participating states designed 16
confidence-building measures (CBM) to address cyber security challenges and prevent
interstate cyber incidents through unintended escalation1. Hence, close collaboration be-
tween states and other relevant stakeholders is critical.
Consequently, this presents us with the paradoxical situation in which security actors
contest multilateral cooperation and spaces for dialogues are shrinking while the im-
1 Council Decision No. 1202. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. 10.03.2016.
Современная Европа, 2022, № 3
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Thomas Greminger, Rose Washington
portance of collaboration and exchange is dramatically increasing. The OSCE resembles
this paradox as the confrontational climate and heightened security challenges amplify
the organisations’ significant relevance [Tiilikainen, OSCE Network, 2015], albeit faced
with critical voices and a lack of trust [Kortunov, 2021]. Simultaneously, polarisation
constraints possibilities of exploring solutions as stakeholders mainly use dialogue plat-
forms for public diplomacy. A lack of personal contacts exacerbated this as a result of
COVID-19. Subsequently, public policy and issuing harsh statements online replaced
discreet dialogues and quiet diplomacy [Greminger et al., 2021]. Moreover, due to a lack
of high-level political engagement, excessive attention is paid to business processes such
as conference agendas, budgets, or personnel instead of addressing Europe’s fundamen-
tal security challenges resulting in important dysfunctionalities of the organisation
[Greminger et al., 2021; Greminger, 2022].
With the COVID-19 pandemic, humankind has experienced how rapidly basic as-
sumptions can change. In this context, preparing for potentially transformative events
such as cyber-attacks (and blackouts), manufactured or natural disasters, space incidents,
and conflicts is pivotal. Global cooperation is needed to tackle these modern security
challenges which transcend borders. Given their complex and transnational nature, even
the most powerful states cannot address these issues independently. As UN Secretary-
General [ UN Secretary-General, 2004:11] accentuated at the U.N. High-Level Panel on
Threats, Challenges, and Change, today’s threats recognise no national boundaries, are
connected, and must be addressed at the global and regional as well as the national lev-
els. No state, no matter how powerful, can by its own efforts alone make itself invulner-
able to today’s threats.
The COVID-19 crisis also demonstrates the importance of information-sharing and
collaboration against common threats [Sachs, 2020]. Conversely, it also revealed the
proliferation of fake news and its weaponisation, underlining the need for accurate in-
formation, evidence-based policy and effective communication campaigns [Greminger et
al., 2021].
While today’s security risks urgently call for collaborative solutions, multilateral ini-
tiatives are increasingly questioned and weakened. States tend to seek national solutions
due to a lack of trust in other states or inter-governmental organisations. As a result, Eu-
rope is captured in an impasse that can only be resolved through dialogue, reengaging,
and reforming multilateral institutions. This paper aims to critically assess Europe’s cur-
rent security environment and propose effective pathways to mitigate risks and restore
peace. Against this background, cooperative security is Europe’s best option to sustaina-
bly counter the ever-growing security threats and prevent devastating conflicts or unin-
tended escalation between states. This article forms seven chapters, unpacking the com-
plex security landscape and the underlying mechanisms sustaining this argument. Chap-
ter two begins by exploring the roots of the current security conditions and laying out the
theoretical dimensions of this research. Chapter three sheds light on cooperative security
as the proposed solution to conflict prevention. Chapters four and five then look at mul-
tilateralism and ways of renewing cooperative security in the face of the prevalent chal-
lenges. Chapter six provides directions and potential future pathways. Lastly, chapter
seven concludes with a summary of the main findings and recommendations.
Современная Европа, 2022, № 3
Reinvigorating Cooperative Security in a Polarised World
9
Need for dialogue
The contemporary polarised and complex security environment brings with it the
need for dialogue to manage risks and cooperatively tackle common problems. Admit-
tedly, this might seem self-evident, but relationships between Russia and the West have
been at a low ebb for almost a decade, suggesting even dialogue is a delicate endeavour.
However, it is crucial to foster dialogue with both proponents and opponents to prevent
conflicts and address common challenges. In this fragile environment, identifying con-
verging interests between different stakeholders and building areas of collaboration that
enable effectively addressing global security challenges becomes essential. For instance,
exploring what Friedrich Ebert Stiftung calls (FES) Islands of Cooperation [FLEET,
2018] or what the EU has referred to in the past as Areas of Selective Engagement
[Fischer, Timofeev, 2018]. One example of possible fora for engagement is the Struc-
tured Dialogue in the context of the OSCE. Established in December 2016 at OSCE’s
Ministerial Council in Hamburg, this platform aspires to stimulate discussions on restor-
ing arms control and enhancing CSBMs1. It became a crucial space for information flow
on perceived risks, military capacity, and de-escalation measures. Despite its vital role in
fostering dialogue, lacking political attention led to the state’s negligence thereof. Ac-
cordingly, revitalising safe spaces for structured dialogue is central to conflict preven-
tion.
The process of constructive engagement itself can build confidence, overcome fears,
and build trust. When explaining why misperceptions are more likely to occur between
conflicting parties, Jervis [Jervis, 1976: 329] stresses that «(…) actors who are cooperat-
ing usually have detailed information about each other, and the greater the information,
the greater the differentiation and diversity that will be perceived». Using a systematic
game approach to analyse trust in international relations, Kydd [Kydd, 2005] observes
that «distrust can be self-perpetuating». Equally, he also notes that cooperative gestures
that stimulate chains of mutually beneficial behaviour can gradually strengthen trust.
Cooperation can lead to reassurance2 and establishing trust [Kydd, 2005]. Analysing the
psychological mechanisms under threat conditions and the Cold War, Osgood [Osgood,
1962] identified the roots of the arms race between the United States and the Soviet Un-
ion in mutual mistrust. He proposed the Gradual Reciprocation in Tension-reduction
(GRIT) strategy to overcome this gridlock. The GRIT approach suggests a series of uni-
lateral cooperative initiatives created to enhance the opponent’s security without under-
mining one’s own. Doing so aims to inform the adversary’s perceptions and build levels
of trust. Yet, the hardest part is often to take the first step: in a tense environment where
both sides post aggressively, conciliatory gestures can be interpreted as weakness. Alt-
1 From Lisbon to Hamburg: Declaration on the Twentieth Anniversary of the OSCE Framework
for Arms Control. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. 9.12.2016. URL:
2 Kydd explains that «reassurance can be defined as the process of building trust. It involves con-
vincing the other side that you prefer to reciprocate cooperation, so that it is safe for them to co-
operate» [Kydd, 2005: 184].
Современная Европа, 2022, № 3
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Thomas Greminger, Rose Washington
hough dialogues are crucial, verbal reassurance does not suffice to build trust. Instead,
they need to be accompanied by costly signals testifying efforts of trustworthy reciprocal
cooperation [Kydd, 2005]. Hence, dialogue is essential but must be followed by credible
and reciprocal actions.
Cooperative Security
During crises, the conventional state strategy is to harden its security measures and
strengthen its defences. However, while the logic is to enhance one’s security, such ac-
tion may increase tensions since the other side feels threatened and bolsters its position
accordingly. Therefore, the challenge is to enhance one’s security, but in a way that does
not jeopardise the security of other states. That is the essence of cooperative security.
Grounded on the empirical findings above, cooperative security is an effective alter-
native to an escalating series of incrementally precarious tit-for-tat reprisals. Exiting this
impasse requires Europe to re-centre its security policy around cooperative security. In
contrast to defensive security mechanisms, cooperative security seeks collaborative solu-
tions. Grounded on the premise that complex security issues require «security with each
other, rather than from each other» [Vetschera, 2007: 39], cooperative security aims to
enhance bilateral and multilateral inter-state relations. In essence, it fosters consultation
in place of confrontation, reassurance as opposed to deterrence, transparency instead of
secrecy, and prevention in lieu of coercion. The Schuman Declaration of 1950 exempli-
fies a case of cooperative security. French foreign minister Robert Schuman put forward
the creation of a European Coal and Steel Community on 9 May 1950. Eager to prevent
another world war, Schuman [Schuman, 2010: 147] concluded, «the solidarity in produc-
tion thus established will make it plain that any war between France and Germany be-
comes not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible». Despite complex relations
within the EU, 70 years of peace between its member states [Biti, Leerssen, Liska, 2021;
Wallensteen, 2021] testify to the preventive power of multilateral collaboration.
Indeed, the more interconnected the world becomes, the more we realise that our se-
curity is indivisible. Humankind depends on each other for energy, trade, information
technology, regulating flows of people, money and illicit goods. Collaboration is crucial
to managing threats and challenges that know no borders, like pandemics, climate
change, and terrorism. The European Union illustrates that cooperation is possible.
However, Europe exceeds the European Union’s borders, including the Balkans, the
Caucasus, Turkey, and Russia. So, the question might arise: How can so many countries
with diverging perspectives and national interests collaborate? As illuminated in the pre-
vious chapter, dialogue and exchange can enhance trust and cooperation between actors.
Nevertheless, for this process to unfold, a joint interest in security combined with com-
monly defined and agreed rules and principles must govern the relations to establish
fairness and predictability [Greminger et al., 2021]. Cooperative security is about con-
ceptualising security together. On these grounds, it encourages states to jointly identify
and prevent threats rather than counter them through deterrence or force. Cooperative
security presents an inclusive approach to building consensus while respecting the prin-
ciple of sovereign equality.
Современная Европа, 2022, № 3
Reinvigorating Cooperative Security in a Polarised World
11
While cooperative security may be needed more than ever to reduce tensions in a Eu-
rope that looks closer to war than at any time since the Second World War and to get
states to work together on a broad set of interconnected and complex challenges that de-
fy borders, how can it be achieved in practice?
Cooperative security can foster dialogue and collaboration among diverse security
actors with diverging agendas. As OSCE’s Secretary-General, searching for consensus
among its members inherently surfaced difficulties and underlined that shaping coopera-
tive security extensively relies on dialogue. As outlined above, dialogue is imperative for
conflict prevention precisely under diverging positions. It enables security actors to iden-
tify red lines, maintain communication channels, and increase transparency in relations.
Though this logical inference may seem too simplistic, it is also worth recalling NATO’s
Harmel doctrine from the late 1960s based on the pillars of deterrence and détente dur-
ing the Cold War ushering the Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe’s
(CSCE) Helsinki process. More recent efforts from think tanks further illuminate the
path towards cooperation by providing expertise and uncovering public perceptions on
European security issues. To illustrate, the Cooperative Security Initiative (CSI), consti-
tuted by 18 experts from OSCE regions, aims to foster cooperation and cultivate new
ideas to reinforce multilateralism through the OSCE in Europe1. In pursuance of a safer
Europe, the CSI stimulates discussion and action to mitigate security risks and increase
multilateral cooperation. Hence, cooperative security allows for consensus-building de-
spite hardened relations.
Furthermore, cooperative security facilitates actions based on jointly defined princi-
ples and rules. For instance, as tensions were rising in Ukraine in early 2014, one of the
authors (T. Greminger) acted as chair of OSCE’s Permanent Council in Vienna. Despite
major divisions between OSCE’s participating countries Russia, Ukraine, the EU, and
the US, the stakeholders reached a consensus on de-escalation measures and deploying
an OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM)2. After almost three weeks of
negotiations with various impasses, all 57 OSCE participating states agreed, by consen-
sus, to create the SMM. The stakeholders’ firm political support was instrumental in
overcoming negotiation hurdles and producing unanimity. A few weeks after adopting
Permanent Council Decision No.1117 to deploy the SMM3, monitoring teams were es-
tablished in ten locations across Ukraine4 [OSCE, 2021]. While initially 100 monitors
were installed, the mission continuously expanded, comprising 1,287 mission members
1
Cooperative Security Initiative.
2022.
2 OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine was established in 2014. On 7th of March 2022
SMM completed evacuation of international staff from the area of operations in Ukraine, DPR and
LPR. SMM mandate expired on March 31, 2022. (Editorial note)
3 Decision No. 1117 Deployment of an OSCE Monitoring Mission to Ukraine. Organization for
Security
and
Co-operation
in
Europe.
21.03.2014.
URL:
4 Initially, first monitoring teams were in Chernivtsi, Dnipropetrovsk (renamed Dnipro in May
2016), Donetsk, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Kyiv, Lviv, Luhansk and Odesa along with
SMM’s headquarters in Kyiv.
Современная Европа, 2022, № 3
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Thomas Greminger, Rose Washington
from 47 OSCE states as of 10 January 2022 [OSCE, 2022]. Since SMM’s deployment,
the international community mission has kept the mission under scrutiny to appease the
tensions. Thus, affirming that action under adverse conditions is possible with coopera-
tive security.
Reengaging and reforming multilateral institutions
As Secretary-General of the OSCE, one of the authors (T. Greminger) has witnessed
first-hand how the politicisation of administrative issues, the pursuit of narrow agendas
to the detriment of consensus, and public policy in place of quiet diplomacy [Kemp, Ig-
natieff, 2001], can lead to gridlock. As a result, the room for manoeuvre of multilateral
institutions is further restrained, which causes national decision-makers to either neglect
or ignore these bodies.
Numerous scholars have examined the reasons behind the crisis of multilateralism
[Brunnée, 2018; Greminger et al., 2021; Lavallée, 2021; Meyer, Sales Marques, Telò,
2021; Szpak, 2021]. Most researchers provide an endogenous explanation of its crisis,
identifying its roots in a lack of legitimacy [Soares de Lima, Albuquerque, 2020; Zürn in
Meyer, Sales Marques, Telò, 2021]. Another strand of literature emphasises exogenous
explanatory factors contributing to multilateral institutions’ decay. According to this line
of argumentation, rising regional and global actors (such as Russia and China) are chal-
lenging multilateral institutions’ composition, while their rising influence is pushing the
international order toward multipolarity [Grant, 2012].
More recent attention has focused on their critical role in addressing the global
COVID-19 pandemic [Cameron, 2020; Sachs, 2020; Carayannis, Weiss, 2021; Hösli et
al., 2021]. Cameron [Cameron, 2020] underlines the importance of the EU and Asia to
collaboratively consolidate and strengthen multilateral institutions in light of the absent
U.S. leadership in mitigating this crisis. The author particularly highlights that economic
recovery strongly depends on a cooperative strategy. In the same vein, according to
Sachs [Sanch, 2020], an effective multilateral system should replace unilateral leader-
ship as only inter-state collaboration would allow us to combat the pandemic. Sachs
[Sachs, 2020: 5] urges that «defending, protecting, preserving, and supporting the multi-
lateral system should be imperative of our times». Hence, reforming multilateral organi-
sations and reengaging their member states is decisive in breaking the vicious cycle and
enhancing its capacity to address global security needs.
Linking bilateral and multilateral processes
While effective multilateralism is essential to deal with emerging threats and chal-
lenges, it will take time to restore confidence in the ability of inter-governmental organi-
sations to cope with these threats and challenges. There are also a wider range of actors
- beyond regional or international organisations - that can play a role in enhancing
peace and security, including the private sector, civil society, think tanks and scientists.
The challenge will be to hold dialogues at different levels while eventually channel-
ling them into a common direction. For example, in light of the crisis between Russia
Современная Европа, 2022, № 3
Reinvigorating Cooperative Security in a Polarised World
13
and the West, bilateral conversations between Washington and Moscow in the Strategic
Stability Dialogue are crucial. Western European countries also have a stake in the pro-
cess, which requires engagement between Russia, the EU, and NATO. However, these
organisations do not include countries in wider Europe, such as the Western Balkans,
South Caucasus, Central Asia, Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine. In this context, the
OSCE, with its inclusive membership and comprehensive approach to security, plays a
key role. Smaller negotiating formats, like the Normandy Four (comprising France,
Germany, the Russian Federation and Ukraine), can also be critical in offering political
impulses. However, despite the variety of platforms, it is often argued that the time is not
ripe for dialogue. My first response would be: what are we waiting for, war? Suppose a
more cooperative approach to security is impossible within these frameworks; a track
two approach could allow to explore possibilities, make proposals, sketch out a process
design, and identify common interests. This was the logic behind the CSI and reflects the
Geneva Centre for Security Policy’s (GCSP) efforts to continue encouraging the formu-
lation of a cooperative security agenda.
The way forward
Grounded on these empirical findings, it is recommended to design a process to fos-
ter dialogue on European security considering the current polarised environment.
Such a process could revitalise the dialogue platform for cooperative security par ex-
cellence, the OSCE. As previously highlighted, we need to strengthen the instruments at
our disposal and promote multilateral fora facing a crisis of confidence 1. Against this
background, ensuring that the OSCE can act effectively again should be at the heart of
this process. While this may seem straightforward, it inevitably requires the participating
states’ political will. Therefore, OSCE’s member states should rally behind a plan focus-
ing on capacitating the organisation and implementing institutional reforms to enhance
its effectiveness. Effective change can be accelerated in close collaboration with the
chairpersonship and the secretariat by centring on previously identified reform priorities
and recommendations [see e.g., Greminger, 2022]. For instance, furthering the imple-
mentation of the Fit4Purpose reform agenda introduced during my tenure as OSCE’s
Secretary-General could be an initial step to increase the organisation’s efficiency and
efficacy. OSCE’s current Secretary-General Helga Schmid also put this idea at the fore-
front by confirming her commitment to reform the management structure and building
on some of the reforms one of the authors (T. Greminger) suggested during his tenure2.
In this spirit, a group of exceptionally committed participating states could drive the ef-
1 Ambassador Thomas Greminger says, “The presentation of the new OSCE is a strong signal”.
Federal
Department
of
Foreign
Affairs.
31.01.2022.
URL:
2 Helga Schmid states “I want to create informal channels of dialogue”. Security and Human
Rights Monitor.
Современная Европа, 2022, № 3
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Thomas Greminger, Rose Washington
forts of enhancing the OSCE’s European security contribution. In its action plan
2022-2025, Switzerland has made a solid commitment to revitalising the OSCE by
strengthening its capacity to act [FDFA, 2022]. Now more than ever, the commitment of
OSCE’s participating states is required to strengthen the most inclusive platform for co-
operative security.
In a second phase, such dialogue could tackle the fundamental issue of cooperative
security: creating a shared understanding of what the Helsinki principles mean in the 21st
century. In the spirit of Helsinki, various European security actors recognise the im-
portance of reviving the ten principles, concluded in Helsinki on 1 August 1975 by High
Representatives of the CSCE’s participating states1. From CSCE’s 35 participating states
to the evolvement into the OSCE with 57 member states, the Helsinki Final Act remains
a core foundation of the organisation fostering peaceful relations among its member
states and sustaining European security. The run-up to the 50th anniversary of the Hel-
sinki Final Act in 2025 provides a unique opportunity to strengthen the OSCE and im-
plement the Helsinki principles. As the president of the Republic of Finland Sauli Ni-
inistö2 succinctly puts it, «The core components of the original Helsinki spirit are equal-
ly topical as they were in 1975: a willingness of adversaries and competitors to engage
in dialogue despite their differences; a broad and cooperative concept of security, one
that includes the human dimension and the interest of individual freedoms and rights,
democracy, and the rule of law; and a commitment to arms control, transparency, and
confidence-building. All of these elements are in great demand in the present».
The current standoff between Russia and the West around Ukraine illustrates the rel-
evance of achieving a common interpretation of fundamental security principles. At the
core of the crisis lies the need to reconcile two fundamental principles of European secu-
rity reaffirmed by the Charter for European Security adopted by the Istanbul Summit3
and the Astana Commemorative Declaration of 20104: equal security and indivisible se-
curity, i.e. each state has the right to freely choose its security arrangements including its
alliances, but at the same time faces the obligation not to expand its own security to the
detriment of another state. Applying these principles to those states situated in-between
the Russian Federation and the OSCE as, for instance, Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova or
Armenia, represents a serious dilemma that can only be resolved by dialogue and diplo-
macy. The current lack of a unanimous interpretation around these principles plays out
in the political arena, threatening European security. Therefore, it becomes evident that a
1 Helsinki Final Act 1975. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. 01.08.1975.
2 Sauli Niinistö highlights “It’s Time to Revive the Helsinki Spirit”, Foreign Policy. 8.07.2021.
ния: 30.01.2022)
3 Istanbul Charter for European Security 1999. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Eu-
ния: 18.02.2022)
4 Astana Commemorative Declaration Towards a Security Community. Astana Commemorative
Declaration of
2010.
(дата обращения: 21.02.2022)
Современная Европа, 2022, № 3
Reinvigorating Cooperative Security in a Polarised World
15
shared understanding of the Helsinki principles among security actors is indispensable in
maintaining peace.
In practical terms, the OSCE could serve as a platform to resume dialogue among
like-minded and non-like-minded members and jointly re-interpret the Helsinki princi-
ples in the current security context. In addition, the GCSP launched a track 1.5 diplomat-
ic dialogue process to bring together experts from the OSCE area and wider Europe to
foster trust and explore joint venues towards global security. Therefore, non-
governmental organisations such as the GCSP can constitute safe spaces where fresh
ideas and constructive approaches are born to rebuild trust and revive the spirit of Hel-
sinki. An active civil society engagement in shaping and driving momentum towards the
Helsinki Final Act’s 50th Anniversary should be at the core of this process.
Conclusion
This article highlighted the need to revitalise cooperative security due to the increas-
ing transnational risks, incidents, and deteriorating arms control systems. Global threats
such as the COVID-19 pandemic, climate change, cyber threats, human trafficking, and
irregular migration exceed national borders and require cross-border solutions. Aug-
menting incidents and accidents at sea, in the air, or on land accelerate the risk of unin-
tended escalation. Arms control systems have dissolved, including the INF, CFE, and the
Open Skies Agreement, previously safeguarding international security. At the same
time, we are currently faced with a paradox, resulting in gridlock. While the alarming
security situation urgently calls for global cooperation, multilateral institutions are in-
creasingly being challenged and weakened. In other words, we are at a critical juncture
in European security. Therefore, re-establishing cooperative security to restore European
security is an urgent endeavour.
Grounded on Jervis’ theoretical findings [Jervis, 1976], this article emphasised the
vital importance of fostering dialogue in the contemporary heightened security environ-
ment to rebuild trust and mitigate risks. Against this background, this paper argued that
cooperative security could pave the way towards enhanced mutual trust and European
security despite these adverse circumstances. In essence, three fundamental characteris-
tics of cooperative security sustain this argument: (1) it is inclusive while respecting
sovereign equality; (2) it allows for consensus-building despite hardened relations; (3) it
can produce action beyond dialogue. Considering that cooperative security can alleviate
the current gridlock, reviving the OSCE as an inclusive platform is crucial. To do so, this
paper recommended capacitating the organisation by implementing proposed reforms.
As a second step, jointly re-interpreting and reviving the Helsinki principles in light of
the 50th anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act in 2025 could foster relations and mutual
trust while contributing to a safer future for Europe and its neighbours. Fifty years ago,
35 states signed the Helsinki Final Act contributing to the end of the Cold War and ush-
ering the CSCE under threatening security conditions. In the wake of its anniversary, it
now lies in our hands to jointly revive its principles and shape a more cooperative and
secure Europe.
Современная Европа, 2022, № 3
16
Thomas Greminger, Rose Washington
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